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Congress Should Not Lower the
Standard for Tax Return Preparers
By Donald B. Tobin
It is rare when Congress is chastised for raising the
ethical standards of lawyers and accountants. That, how-
ever, is what is happening now as a result of Congress’s
successful efforts to raise the standards for lawyers and
others who prepare or help prepare tax returns. The new
standards require tax professionals, who are providing
taxpayers with advice on how to treat items on a tax
return, to believe that the position is more likely than not
correct before advising a taxpayer to take such a posi-
tion.1 A preparer can advocate that a taxpayer take a
position that may not meet the more likely than not
(MLTN) standard if that position is disclosed on the
return. In other words, a tax professional must believe a
position has at least a 50 percent chance of success before
recommending it, or the IRS must be told that the
position is questionable. Many tax professionals have
argued that Congress went too far and should lower the
standard.2 The higher standard, however, helps ensure a
fairer tax system and discourages overly aggressive tax
reporting.
Why Is This Important?
The central question here involves the obligations of
tax professionals when advising taxpayers regarding
return positions. Tax professionals have a duty to both
the clients they serve and to the tax system as a whole.
There is a tension between the tax professional as an
aggressive planner for the client and the professional as a
guardian of the law and our system of justice. Recently,
the balance has tilted too far toward aggressive advocacy.
Tax and accounting malfeasance at Enron, WorldCom,
Tyco, and Arthur Andersen, to name just a few, have
increased national attention on ethical issues in tax
practice and bookkeeping. Lawyers, accountants, and
other tax return preparers have played a major role in
assisting companies in defrauding consumers, investors,
stock holders, and regulators.3 Tax practitioners have
been willing to push the envelope and to make or employ
creative and sometimes ludicrous tax avoidance schemes.
Because the standards were relatively low, tax practi-
tioners had a strong incentive to be aggressive.4 The
move by Congress to raise the standards for reporting a
position helps to reverse this trend.
In many ways, a tax return preparer’s role is special in
our legal system. Because we have a system of taxation
based on voluntary compliance, and because audit rates
are low, the system depends on honest reporting. Gener-
ally outside the tax context, a lawyer has an obligation
not to file a claim or to take a position if the claim or
position is frivolous. But if we use a frivolous standard in
the tax arena, attorneys and other tax professionals
would have every incentive to recommend that their
clients take aggressive tax positions. After all, only a few
returns are ever audited, and it is easy to justify a
position as ‘‘not frivolous.’’
Tax attorneys (and, in some cases, other tax profes-
sionals) generally have two different functions, and the
ethical standards employed may be different depending
on the role they are playing. Sometimes the tax profes-
sional acts as an adviser. In this role, she advises her
client on a return position in various ways. She may
advise a client on whether a position is justified, how to
set up a transaction, or how to take advantage of a
loophole in the tax law. When she acts as an adviser, the
ethical and statutory responsibilities provide a check on
abuse. The preparer’s involvement provides, in a sense, a
seal of approval. In that circumstance, it makes sense to
hold the preparer to a higher standard.5
1Section 6694.
2See, e.g., American Bar Association Section of Taxation,
Legislative Changes Impacting Standards for Imposition of Penalties,
Nov. 25, 2007, available at http://abanet.org (last visited July 2,
2008); American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Com-
ments on Revisions to Section 6694 Changing Tax Return Reporting
Standard for Preparers, July 10, 2007, available at http://
tax.aicpa.org (last visited July 2, 2008); New York State Bar
Association Tax Section, Recent and Proposed Statutory Changes to
Tax Return Preparer Penalty Rules of Internal Revenue Code Section
6694 and Related Issues, Jan. 28, 2008, available at http://
www.nysba.org (last visited July 2, 2008).
3See Linda M. Beale, ‘‘Tax Advice Before the Return: The Case
for Raising the Standards and Denying Evidentiary Privileges,’’
25 Va. Tax Rev. 583, 598 (2006) (noting aggressive practices by
lawyers and arguing that standard be raised to discourage
aggressive tax reporting and planning).
4Id. at 608 (taxpayers and tax advisers engage in cost-benefit
analysis, and the economic model suggests that aggressive tax
planning is efficient).
5When a tax professional is acting as an advocate in an
adversarial proceeding, the professional has a duty to aggres-
sively defend the client, and the MLTN standard does not apply.
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What Is the Dispute About?
A standard that requires a tax professional to believe
that the position she advocates has at least a 50 percent
chance of success makes perfect sense. Why should tax
professionals advise a taxpayer to take a position if they
do not believe the position is more likely right than
wrong? Lawyers and accountants charge significant fees
to make these decisions, and it seems appropriate to
require that they have some level of certainty before they
advise a taxpayer to take a particular position.
Many in the profession, however, have cried foul. For
example, the American Bar Association Section of Taxa-
tion and the American Institute of Certified Public Ac-
countants have expressed concern over the higher
standard.6 Both organizations claim that the standard is
too high and are advocating that Congress lower the
standard.7 To understand the current controversy, a little
background is required.
Before last year’s change, section 6694 provided that a
return preparer could be charged a penalty if there was
an understatement of tax on a return and that understate-
ment was due to a position on the return for which there
was not a realistic possibility of success on the merits.
The preparer is subject to the penalty only if she knew or
had reason to know the taxpayer took such a position
and the item was not properly disclosed on the return.
This realistic possibility of success idea was included in
IRS guidance and created a general obligation that a
lawyer, accountant, or other tax adviser not advise a
taxpayer to take a position on a return unless there was a
realistic possibility of success (defined as a 33 percent
chance of success on the merits).8 Interestingly, taxpayers
can be penalized for taking a position on a return without
having a substantial basis for that position (defined as
about a 40 percent chance of success).9 So before the
recently enacted legislation, tax return preparers actually
had a lower standard than taxpayers who acted without
professional assistance.
Last year, as part of the Small Business and Work
Opportunity Tax Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-28), Congress
amended section 6694 and subjected tax return preparers
to a penalty if there was an understatement of tax
liability, the preparer knew or reasonably should have
known of the position, and ‘‘there was not a reasonable
belief that the position would more likely than not be
sustained on its merits.’’10 A preparer could avoid the
penalty if he had a reasonable basis for the position
(approximately 20 percent chance) and properly dis-
closed the position. The substantial authority standard in
section 6662 was not changed, so taxpayers now are
subject to a lower standard than for hired professionals
(40 percent chance of success for taxpayers, and 50
percent for return preparers).
So after 2007, if a preparer believed he had better than
a 50-50 chance of winning on a position, he could
recommend it without penalty and without being re-
quired to disclose it. If he thought he had less than a 50-50
chance, he could recommend the position as long as he
had a 20 percent chance and disclosed the position. This
regime is perfectly reasonable.
Tax professionals raise several concerns, many of
which are technical concerns, about the way the statute
might be enforced, but there are two main concerns. First,
that taxpayers’ standards are lower than professionals’
causes ethical problems for the practitioner, because
professionals, by having a higher standard, have an
incentive to urge taxpayers to disclose even though the
taxpayer has no independent obligation to do so. This
would occur when the chance of success was between the
40 percent required for the taxpayer to avoid penalties
and the 50 percent required for the preparer. Presumably,
the higher disclosure requirement for taxpayers is disad-
vantageous because it would increase the chances the IRS
would examine the position. Second, the 50 percent
standard is too high a standard.11
The commentators are correct that there are problems
caused by the differential standards. If the standards are
different, a preparer would have an incentive to encour-
age disclosure or to encourage a taxpayer not to take a
position, when the taxpayer would have no such incen-
tive if the taxpayer did not use a preparer. In some
circumstances, this might discourage taxpayers from
getting competent tax advice. The problem could be
addressed through a disclosure by the practitioner to the
client regarding the different standards, or by increasing
the taxpayer standard to the 50 percent standard that
applies to professionals.12 In general, it makes sense for
the standard for tax return preparers and taxpayers to be
the same, but the system will be better served if the
standard for both preparers and taxpayers is the 50
percent more likely than not standard and not the lower
reasonable basis standard. The higher standard will
encourage accurate self-reporting and will discourage
taxpayers and tax professionals from taking overly ag-
gressive reporting positions.
The underlying question is how much of a burden is
this higher standard on taxpayers and preparers, and is
that burden correct in a system that depends on volun-
tary compliance. A large majority of individual taxpayers
— more than 60 percent — do not itemize on their income
tax returns.13 These taxpayers have very little difficulty
6Supra note 2.
7Id. See also H.R. 6049 (would lower the standard from MLTN
to substantial authority).
8Reg. section 1.6694-2.
9Section 6662.
10Section 6694.
11ABA tax section, Legislative Changes Impacting Standards,
supra note 2.
12Also, the regulations proposed by Treasury provide that
when a position satisfies the taxpayer standard but does not
satisfy the preparer standard, a preparer may meet the disclo-
sure obligations by disclosing to the taxpayer that the preparer
believes the position meets the substantial basis standard (the
taxpayer standard) but that it does not meet the MLTN stand-
ard. Prop. reg. section 1.6694-2 and -3.
13Brian Balkovic, ‘‘Individual Income Tax Returns, Prelimi-
nary Data, 2006,’’ Statistics of Income Bulletin, Spring 2008,
available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/06inplim.pdf (last
visited July 2, 2008).
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determining whether they have a 50 percent chance of
success on the merits of a position. Even taxpayers who
itemize on their returns do not usually take a position
unless they believe it is correct. Taxpayers generally
know whether their mortgage interest is deductible, or
whether they are entitled to a deduction for charitable
contributions. The difference between a 40 percent and 50
percent standard will simply not affect them. The stan-
dard mainly comes into play when taxpayers are taking
aggressive positions or when they have very sophisti-
cated tax returns. So the real burden of this change falls
on individuals filing complex returns and business tax-
payers.
Some preparers argue that it is often hard to determine
whether a position satisfies MLTN standard.14 Many tax
situations involve a balancing of facts and circumstances.
They argue that it is often hard to know exactly how the
situation will turn out. In those instances, taxpayers
routinely take the position most advantageous to them.
Because only 1 percent to 2 percent of returns are audited,
the odds are strongly in taxpayers’ favor. Under the
pre-2007 rules, tax return preparers had every incentive
to encourage taxpayers to take aggressive positions. But
a system that requires voluntary compliance should not
also favor aggressive reporting of tax positions. If a tax
professional is unsure whether a position meets the
MLTN standard, she can either recommend that the
taxpayer take the position and disclose the particulars of
the situation, or she can recommend that the taxpayer not
take the position. It is important to remember that
nothing prevents taxpayers from taking positions that do
not meet the MLTN as long as they disclose the position.
The new rules do not prohibit taxpayers from taking
aggressive positions. They just insist that when they do
so, they disclose that position.
Disclosure is important because it is often difficult to
tell by simply looking at a return the basis on which a
taxpayer decided to take a deduction. Without disclo-
sure, the IRS has no way to know that the taxpayer’s
treatment of an item on the return is at all questionable.
Thus, a system that requires a reasonably high level of
certainty for blind reporting and a lower level for dis-
closed positions makes sense.15
The proposal moving through Congress would lower
the standard for tax professionals to that of taxpayers.
This is an improvement from pre-2007 law in that it at
least keeps the standard for tax professionals at the same
level as that for taxpayers (instead of reducing to pre-
2007 levels). It is, however, a step back from current law.
A system that requires voluntary compliance should
not reward aggressive taxpayers who hide the ball. It
should encourage taxpayers to take positions that they
believe are more likely than not correct. If a taxpayer
wants to take a position when she is not sure it is correct,
she can disclose the position, and the Service, if it
chooses, can examine that treatment. The MLTN stan-
dard encourages taxpayers and preparers to think twice
before taking aggressive positions. Honest, transparent,
and accurate reporting is essential for tax administrations
and provides for a fairer tax system.
14See ABA tax section, Legislative Changes Impacting Standards,
supra note 2.
15It is possible that this provision could lead to overreporting
and that the IRS could not administratively handle those
disclosures. Congress, however, did not mandate the type or
method of reporting. If the IRS believes that the increase in
disclosure will be an administrative burden on either the Service
or on professionals, it can provide for a simpler method of
disclosure. The crux of the issue is whether a higher standard is
appropriate. The technical concerns of preparers are real and
should be addressed, but they do not provide sufficient reasons
for lowering the standards.
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